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Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring

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  • Palmer, Karen

    ()
    (Resources for the Future)

  • Ando, Amy

Abstract

Retail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains.

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File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-98-19-REV.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-98-19-rev.

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Date of creation: 01 May 1998
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Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-98-19-rev

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  1. P. L. Joskow & R. G. Noll, 1978. "Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview," Working papers 218, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers dp-97-25, Resources For the Future.
  3. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
  4. Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
  5. Palmer, Karen & Burtraw, Dallas, 1997. "Electricity restructuring and regional air pollution," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 139-174, March.
  6. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  7. Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 646-79, June.
  8. Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
  9. Bohi, Douglas R. & Palmer, Karen L., 1996. "The efficiency of wholesale vs. retail competition in electricity," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(8), pages 12-20, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sanyal, Paroma & Bulan, Laarni T., 2011. "Regulatory risk, market uncertainties, and firm financing choices: Evidence from U.S. Electricity Market Restructuring," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 248-268, June.
  2. Nagayama, Hiroaki, 2010. "Impacts on investments, and transmission/distribution loss through power sector reforms," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 3453-3467, July.
  3. Burtraw, Dallas, 1998. "Cost Savings, Market Performance and Economic Benefits of the U.S. Acid Rain Program," Discussion Papers dp-98-28-rev, Resources For the Future.
  4. Palmer, Karen & Brennan, Timothy & Martinez, Salvador, 2001. "Implementing Electricity Restructuring: Policies, Potholes, and Prospects," Discussion Papers dp-01-62-, Resources For the Future.
  5. Delmas, Magali & Tokat, Yesim, 2003. "Deregulation Process, Governance Structures and Efficiency: The U.S. Electric Utility Sector," Research Papers 1790, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  6. Paulina Beato & Carmen Fuente, 1999. "Retail Competition in Electricity," IDB Publications 46898, Inter-American Development Bank.
  7. Donald N. Dewees, 2006. "Electricity Restructuring and Regulation in the Provinces: Ontario and Beyond," Working Papers tecipa-205, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  8. Sharabaroff, Alexander & Boyd, Roy & Chimeli, Ariaster, 2009. "The environmental and efficiency effects of restructuring on the electric power sector in the United States: An empirical analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4884-4893, November.
  9. Burtraw, Dallas & Palmer, Karen, 2005. "The Environmental Impacts of Electricity Restructuring: Looking Back and Looking Forward," Discussion Papers dp-05-07, Resources For the Future.
  10. James Bushnell, 2011. "Building Blocks: Investment in Renewable and Nonrenewable Technologies," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/53, European University Institute.
  11. Chang, Chun Ping & Berdiev, Aziz N., 2011. "The political economy of energy regulation in OECD countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 816-825, September.
  12. Paroma Sanyal, 2005. "Powering a Green Progress: The Effect of Electricity Deregulation on Environmental Research," Industrial Organization 0504015, EconWPA.
  13. Faye Steiner, 2004. "The Market Response to Restructuring: A Behavioral Model," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 59-80, January.
  14. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner & Mauro F. Guillen, 2004. "International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-713, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  15. Mozumder, Pallab & Marathe, Achla, 2004. "Gains from an integrated market for tradable renewable energy credits," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 259-272, July.

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