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Financial Services Industry PAC Contributions and Senate Committee Membership

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  • Randall Bennett
  • Christine Loucks

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between relevant senate committee membership and campaign contributions from financial services industry political action committees (PACs) from 1998 to 2002. Since this was a period of significant legislative activity affecting the industry, it provides a fruitful time period to investigate the relationship between contributions and committee membership. It is found that membership on the Senate Banking Committee is consistently related to contributions from financial services PACs. Membership on the Senate Finance Committee is related to PAC contributions from some sectors of the industry for some time periods. It is also found that contributions are significantly higher for those senators facing re-election in the particular election cycle. The importance of relevant committee membershipto PAC contributions in the senate is consistent with previous work dealing with the House. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2011

Suggested Citation

  • Randall Bennett & Christine Loucks, 2011. "Financial Services Industry PAC Contributions and Senate Committee Membership," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 39(3), pages 203-216, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:39:y:2011:i:3:p:203-216
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-011-9277-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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