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The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions

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  • Thomas J. Prusa

Abstract

In this paper I present evidence on the effectiveness of AD actions. Using a data set based on the line-item tariff codes identified in the cases, I examine the trade patterns of both countries named in the petition and those countries not subject to the investigation. Several important findings emerge. First, AD duties substantially restrict the volume of trade from named countries, especially for those cases with high duties. Second, AD actions that are rejected still have an important impact on named country trade, especially during the period of investigation. Third, there is substantial trade diversion from named to non-named countries and the diversion is greater the larger is the estimated duty. Because of the diversion of imports, the overall volume of trade continues to growþeven for those cases which result in duties. Fourth, despite the diversion of imports, AD law still offers important benefits because it induces substantial import price increases both by named and non- named countries. Finally, because of the diversion of imports, aggressive use of AD law by U.S. firms has the peculiar side-effect of benefiting non-named countries who are active in the areas under investigation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 5440.

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Date of creation: Jan 1996
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Publication status: published as The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies, R. Feenstra, ed.pp. 191-213, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5440

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  1. Anderson, James E, 1992. "Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 65-83, March.
  2. Fischer, Ronald D., 1992. "Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 149-163, February.
  3. Robert Baldwin & Jeffrey Steagall, 1994. "An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 290-308, June.
  4. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August.
  5. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1989. "Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion," NBER Working Papers 3016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "The Road Most Taken: the Rise of Title VII Protection," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 295-313, 03.
  7. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," NBER Working Papers 4696, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole," NBER Working Papers 5062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Harrison, Ann, 1991. "The new trade protection : price effects of antidumping and countervailing measures in the United States," Policy Research Working Paper Series 808, The World Bank.
  11. Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-66, June.
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