Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States
AbstractThis paper provides estimates of the trade impacts of U.S. antidumping law and the determinants of suit filing activity from 1980-1985. We study three possible channels through which the threat or mere possibility of antidumping duties can restrict trade which we believe, when combined with the direct effects of duties, capture most of the trade effects of antidumping law. We refer to these three non- duty effects as the investigation effect, the suspension effect, and the withdrawal effect. Investigation effects occur when an antidumping investigation takes place; suspension effects occur under so-called 'suspension agreements'; and withdrawal effects occur after a petition is simply withdrawn without a final determination. We find substantial trade restrictions associated with the first two effects, but not with the third. Finally, we find evidence suggesting that some firms initiate antidumping procedures for the trade restricting investigation effects alone.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4696.
Date of creation: Apr 1994
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Other versions of this item:
- Robert Staiger & Frank Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," International Trade 9410004, EconWPA.
- Staiger, R.W. & Wolak, F.A., 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumpting in the United States," Working papers 9413, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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NBER Working Papers
3254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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