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Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization

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Author Info
Anderson, Simon P.
Schmitt, Nicolas

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Abstract

This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from u sing tariffs only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second, there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third, the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of ta riffs by NTBs depend on industry characteristics. These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 254.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_254

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Related research
Keywords: Tariffs; trade policy; reciprocal dumping; quotas; antidumping;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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  1. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 449-66, July.
  2. James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Robert Baldwin & Jeffrey Steagall, 1994. "An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 290-308, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marvel, Howard P & Ray, Edward J, 1983. "The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 190-97, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Anderson, James E., 1993. "Domino dumping II: Anti-dumping," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 133-150, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Cassing, James H. & Hillman, Arye L., 1985. "Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 279-290, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. James Nieberding, 1999. "The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 65-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995. "Protection and the Business Cycle," Discussion Papers 1130, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Fischer, Ronald D., 1992. "Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 149-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gallaway, Michael P. & Blonigen, Bruce A. & Flynn, Joseph E., 1999. "Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-244, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Krishna, Kala, 1989. "Trade restrictions as facilitating practices," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 251-270, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Kaempfer, William H & Marks, Stephen V & Willett, Thomas D, 1988. "Why Do Large Countries Prefer Quantitative Trade Restrictions?," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 625-46.
  13. Deardorff, Alan V., 1987. "Why do governments prefer nontariff barriers?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 191-216, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Rosendorff, B Peter, 1996. "Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 544-61, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. repec:att:wimass:199511 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Anderson, Simon P. & Schmitt, Nicolas & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1995. "Who benefits from antidumping legislation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 321-337, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Brian R. Copeland, 1990. "Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable and Non-negotiable Trade Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 84-108, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Ray, Edward John, 1981. "The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 105-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Falvey, Rodney E & Lloyd, P J, 1991. "Uncertainty and the Choice of Protective Instrument," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 463-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Brander, James A., 1981. "Intra-industry trade in identical commodities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Anderson, James E, 1992. "Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 65-83, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. McCulloch, Rachel, 1987. "Why do governments prefer nontariff barriers? A comment on deardorff," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 217-221, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michael Moore & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?," ECARES Working Papers 2008_024, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2005. "Tariff Liberalization and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?," International Trade 0501001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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