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Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics

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Rosendorff, B Peter

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Abstract

A voluntary export restraint (VER) is preferred to a tariff by a government concerned about electoral returns when the influence of industry profits is large relative to the losses to consumers from higher prices. If the foreign firm is uncertain of these pressures, the antidumping code facilitates the complete transfer of the relevant information and generates a VER rather than a tariff in equilibrium. The choice across instruments is determined by the political attributes. Domestic and foreign profits rise with the antidumping-generated VER, and the VER lowers the volume of trade by more than the expected duty. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 86 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 544-61
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:3:p:544-61

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  1. Bruce A. Blonigen & KaSaundra Tomlin & Wesley W. Wilson, 2002. "Tariff-jumping FDI and Domestic Firms' Profits," NBER Working Papers 9027, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Philip I. Levy, 2003. "Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories," Working Papers 852, Economic Growth Center, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jozef Konings & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2004. "Antidumping Protection and Markups of Domestic Firms: Evidence from Firm Level Data," LICOS Discussion Papers 14104, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, K.U.Leuven. [Downloadable!]
  4. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1998. "Import Peneteration and the Politics of Trade Protection," NBER Working Papers 6711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. GASMI, Farid & MALIN, Eric & TANDÉ, François, 2004. "Lobbying in Antidumping," IDEI Working Papers 320, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bruce A. Blonigen & KaSaundra Tomlin & Wesley W. Wilson, 2001. "Tariff-jumping FDI and Domestic Firms’ Profits," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2002-5, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jun 2002. [Downloadable!]
  7. Anderson, Simon P. & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2000. "Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Bruce A. Blonigen & Stephen E. Haynes, 1999. "Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Antidumping Duties," NBER Working Papers 7378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bruce A. Blonigen & Stephen E. Haynes, 2002. "Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1044-1061, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bruce A. Blonigen & KaSaundra Tomlin & Wesley W. Wilson, 2002. "Tariff-jumping FDI and Domestic Firms’ Profits," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-23, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jun 2002. [Downloadable!]
  11. Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 1999. "Dumping and Double Crossing: The (In)Effectiveness of Cost-Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 6986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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