Voluntary Export Restraints, Anti-Dumping Procedure and Domestic Politics
AbstractA voluntary export restraint (VER) is preferred to a tariff by a government concerned about electoral returns when the influence of industry profits is large relative to the losses to consumers from higher prices. If the foreign firm is uncertain of these pressures, the antidumping code facilitates the complete transfer of the relevant information and generates a VER rather than a tariff in equilibrium. The choice across instruments is determined by the political attributes. Domestic and foreign profits rise with the antidumping-generated VER, and the VER lowers the volume of trade by more than the expected duty. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Southern California - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 9512.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 90089-0152 U.S.A.
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Other versions of this item:
- Rosendorff, B Peter, 1996. "Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 544-61, June.
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F19 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Other
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