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Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?

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  • Robert M. Feinberg
  • Kara M. Reynolds

Abstract

Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non-traditional protection such as anti-dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti-dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti-dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti-dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti-dumping protection but also the total number of anti-dumping petitions filed by countries. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd .

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal World Economy.

Volume (Year): 30 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (06)
Pages: 948-961

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Handle: RePEc:bla:worlde:v:30:y:2007:i:6:p:948-961

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  1. Thomas J. Prusa, 1999. "On the spread and impact of antidumping," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics 199916, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  2. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Antidumping: what are the numbers to discuss at Doha?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9831, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Chad Bown & Meredith Crowley, 2003. "Trade deflection and trade depression," Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago WP-03-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  4. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 877–890, April.
  5. Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983. "A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 313-321, November.
  6. Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Bown, 2001. "Antidumping and Retaliation Threats," NBER Working Papers 8576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Simon P. Anderson & Nicolas Schmitt, 2000. "Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization," Virginia Economics Online Papers 340, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
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