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On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping

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Author Info
Thomas J. Prusa
Abstract

This paper documents two key costs of AD protection. First, once AD has been adopted countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years 'new' users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD statute a decade ago. Second, I will show that on average AD duties cause the value of imports to fall by 30-50%. I find that trade falls by almost as much for settled cases as those that result in duties. Interestingly, I also find that even for those cases that are rejected imports fall. The spread and impact of AD protection most surely implies that AD will continue to be a key negotiating item in the next WTO round.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7404.

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Date of creation: Oct 1999
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7404

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F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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  1. Mikhail Klimenko & Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 2001. "Recurrent Trade Agreements and the Value of External Enforcement," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2001-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ronald B. Davies & Benjamin Liebman, 2003. "Self-Protection: Antidumping Duties, Collusion and FDI," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-36, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Nov 2003. [Downloadable!]
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