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The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings

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Author Info
Robert M. Feinberg (American University)
Kara M. Olson (American University)

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Abstract

Over the past decade, the world-wide use of antidumping has become very widespread – 41 WTO-member countries initiated antidumping cases over the 1995-2003 period. From another perspective, US exporters were subjected to 139 antidumping cases during this period, by enforcement agencies representing 20 countries. In this context, it is natural to consider whether antidumping filings may be motivated as retaliation against similar measures imposed on a country’s exporters. This is the focus of our study, though we also control for the bilateral export flows involved and non-retaliatory impacts of past cases, with other motivations – macroeconomic, industry-specific and political considerations – dealt with through industry, country and year fixed effects. Applying probit analysis to a WTO database on reported filings, we find strong evidence that retaliation was a significant motive in explaining the rise of antidumping filings over the past decade, though interesting differences emerge in the reactions to traditional and new users of antidumping.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series International Trade with number 0411003.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 04 Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpit:0411003

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 27
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Related research
Keywords: antidumping; retaliation;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Robert Staiger & Frank Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," International Trade 9410004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Bown, Chad P., 2003. "Antidumping and retaliation threats," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 591-611, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Anti-dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 403-433, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Aggarwal, Aradhna, 2004. "Macro Economic Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1043-1057, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Feinberg, Robert M. & Hirsch, Barry T., 1989. "Industry rent seeking and the filing of unfair trade complaints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 325-340. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Choi, E Kwan & Harrigan, James, 2004. "Handbook of International Trade," Staff General Research Papers 11375, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Knetter, Michael M. & Prusa, Thomas J., 2003. "Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence from four countries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-17, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2007. "Trade deflection and trade depression," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 176-201, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kara M. Reynolds, 2009. "Overcoming Free Riding: A Cross Country Analysis of Firm Participation in Antidumping Petitions," Working Papers 2009-01, American University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005. "On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements," Economics Working Papers 914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Meredith Crowley, 2007. "Cyclical dumping and U.S. antidumping protection: 1980-2001," Working Paper Series WP-07-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bown, Chad P., 2006. "The World Trade Organization and antidumping in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4014, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Michael Moore & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?," ECARES Working Papers 2008_024, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
  7. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Global antidumping database version 1.0," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3737, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2008. "Friendly Fire? The Impact of US Antidumping Enforcement on US Exporters," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 144(2), pages 366-378, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Bown, Chad P., 2009. "The global resort to antidumping, safeguards, and other trade remedies amidst the economic crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5051, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  10. Kara Reynolds, 2006. "Dumping on U.S. Farmers: Are There Biases in Global Antidumping Regulations?," Working Papers 2006-03, American University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hylke, VANDENBUSSCHE & Maurizio, ZANARDI, 2007. "What Explains the Proliferation of Antidumping Laws ?," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007027, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Moore, Michael O. & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2006. "Does antidumping use contribute to trade liberalization? : an empirical analysis," Discussion Paper 61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  13. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2005. "Tariff Liberalization and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?," International Trade 0501001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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