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Dumping on U.S. Farmers: Are There Biases in Global Antidumping Regulations?

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  • Kara Reynolds

    (Department of Economics, American University)

Abstract

The explosion of antidumping activity over the past 10 years has raised concern among agriculture analysts that antidumping regulations are biased toward imposing more protection on U.S. agricultural goods than other products. This research fails to find a statistically significant bias in the outcomes of antidumping investigations involving agricultural goods compared to other products, nor does it find significant evidence that foreign antidumping investigations into imports of food products have resulted in higher levels of protection than U.S. investigations. However, the results from a comprehensive case study analysis suggest that despite the lack of statistical evidence of bias, U.S. agricultural producers have reason to question the fairness of global antidumping regulations. Given these results, government officials should consider whether U.S. food producers could be better served by changes to both U.S. antidumping regulations and the World Trade Organization Antidumping Agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Kara Reynolds, 2006. "Dumping on U.S. Farmers: Are There Biases in Global Antidumping Regulations?," Working Papers 2006-03, American University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:amu:wpaper:0306
    DOI: 10.17606/cysn-3a73
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.17606/cysn-3a73
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(1994 Micr), pages 51-118.
    2. Gunning-Trant, Caroline & Carter, Colin A., 2003. "Trade Remedy Laws And Nafta Agricultural Trade," Working Papers 11962, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    3. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(4), pages 877-890, April.
    4. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(4), pages 877-890, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vandenbussche, Hylke & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2010. "The chilling trade effects of antidumping proliferation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 760-777, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antidumping; agriculture trade; import protection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade

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