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China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement

In: China's Growing Role in World Trade

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  • Chad P. Bown

Abstract

This chapter assesses China's integration into the global trading system by examining areas of international political-economic "friction" associated with its increased trade. We use a number of newly constructed data sets to examine tensions associated with its rapidly increasing trade and the trade policy commitments that China and its trading partners have undertaken as part of its 2001 WTO accession. With respect to China's exports, we examine data on WTO members' use of antidumping and their discriminatory treatment of Chinese firms prior to and following accession. We conclude that the application of antidumping against China has become more discriminatory since its 2001 accession. Furthermore, evidence from a regression analysis rules out the theory that pre-accession discrimination is associated with foreign targeting of high import tariff Chinese products as a WTO accession negotiation strategy. We also provide evidence that WTO members are also discriminating against China's exports by substituting use of new import-restricting "China-safeguard" policy instruments. Next, with respect to China's imports, we examine data on China's antidumping use - now the WTO's fifth most frequent user of antidumping - by targeted sectors and countries. We also provide evidence from products within China's largest sectoral user of a positive relationship between the size of the accession year tariff liberalization and the subsequent resort to antidumping protection after accession. Finally, we examine China's experience in managing frictions associated with its growing role in world trade through formal WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

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This chapter was published in:

  • Robert C. Feenstra & Shang-Jin Wei, 2010. "China's Growing Role in World Trade," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feen07-1, July.
    This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 10463.

    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10463

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    1. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2011. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1238-73, June.
    2. Michael Owen Moore & Alan Fox, 2008. "Why Don't Foreign Firms Cooperate in U.S. Antidumping Investigations?: An Emperical Analysis," Working Papers 2008-17, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
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    4. Patrick A. Messerlin, 2004. "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 18(1), pages 105-130.
    5. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    6. Chad Bown & Meredith Crowley, 2003. "Trade deflection and trade depression," Working Paper Series WP-03-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    7. Thomas Prusa & Michael Knetter, 2000. "Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries," Departmental Working Papers 200023, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    8. Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Participation in," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(2), pages 287-310.
    9. Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Bown, 2001. "Antidumping and Retaliation Threats," NBER Working Papers 8576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    12. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank.
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    15. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2003. "Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S Antidumping Activity," NBER Working Papers 9625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Chad P. Bown, 2004. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 434, Econometric Society.
    17. Wendy L. Hansen & Thomas J. Prusa, 1995. "Cumulation and ITC Decision-Making: The Sum of the Parts is Greater thanthe Whole," NBER Working Papers 5062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    20. Thomas J. Prusa, 1999. "On the spread and impact of antidumping," Departmental Working Papers 199916, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
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    23. Patrick Messerlin, 2004. "China in the World Trade Organization: Antidumping and Safeguards," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8335, Sciences Po.
    24. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
    25. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C & Nordström, Håkan, 1999. "Is The Use Of The WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2340, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:
    1. Mattoo, Aaditya & Subramanian, Arvind, 2011. "China and the world trading system," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5897, The World Bank.
    2. Mohini Datt & Bernard Hoekman & Mariem Malouche, 2011. "Taking Stock of Trade Protectionism Since 2008," World Bank Other Operational Studies 10068, The World Bank.
    3. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2012. "Import protection, business cycles, and exchange rates : evidence from the great recession," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6038, The World Bank.
    4. Irene Brambilla & Amit K. Khandelwal & Peter K. Schott, 2010. "China's Experience under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)," NBER Chapters, in: China's Growing Role in World Trade, pages 345-387 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Aaditya Mattoo & Prachi Mishra & Arvind Subramanian, 2012. "A China Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations," Working Paper Series WP12-4, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    6. Bown, Chad P. & Prusa, Thomas J., 2010. "U.S. antidumping: much ado about zeroing," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5352, The World Bank.
    7. Chad Bown & Meredith Crowley, 2004. "China's export growth and U.S. trade policy," Working Paper Series WP-04-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    8. Regina M. Abrami & Yu Zheng, 2010. "The New Face of Chinese Industrial Policy: Making Sense of Anti-Dumping Cases in the Petrochemical and Steel Industries," Harvard Business School Working Papers 11-042, Harvard Business School.
    9. Chad P. Bown, 2011. "Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties, 1990–2009," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(12), pages 1955-1998, December.
    10. Baybars Karacaovali, 2011. "Turkey: Temporary Trade Barriers as Resistance to Trade Liberalisation with the European Union?," Fordham Economics Discussion Paper Series dp2011-02, Fordham University, Department of Economics.
    11. Bown, Chad P., 2009. "The global resort to antidumping, safeguards, and other trade remedies amidst the economic crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5051, The World Bank.

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