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The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings

In: Economic Effects of Antidumping

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  • Thomas J. Prusa
  • Susan Skeath

Abstract

The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings. – This paper looks at worldwide antidumping activity during the last two decades. We examine the motives for AD filings by countries in an attempt to identify whether economic or strategic concerns are driving the recent upsurge in AD use. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the data on cases initiated in the 1980–1998 period. We then use nonparametric methods to identify motivations for the use of antidumping and find considerable support for strategic motivations. This suggests that the rise in AD activity cannot be solely explained by an increase in unfair trading practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas J. Prusa & Susan Skeath, 2021. "The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 11, pages 233-257, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789811225253_0011
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    1. Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983. "A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 313-321, November.
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    4. Wendy L Hansen & Thomas J Prusa, 2021. "Cumulation and ITC decision-making: The sum of the parts is greater than the whole," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 9, pages 171-194, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    8. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Bown, Chad P., 2003. "Antidumping and retaliation threats," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, August.
    9. Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 4, pages 45-65, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Tharakan, P. K. M. & Waelbroeck, J., 1994. "Antidumping and countervailing duty decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S.: An experiment in comparative political economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 171-193, January.
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