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The World Trade Organization and antidumping in developing countries

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Author Info
Bown, Chad P.
Abstract

Since the 1995 inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), developing countries have become some of the most frequent users of the WTO-sanctioned antidumping trade policy instrument. This paper exploits newly available data to examine the pattern of actual industrial use of antidumping in nine of the major " new user " developing countries - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela. For these countries we are able to match data from two newly available sources: data on production in 28 different 3-digit ISIC industries from the Trade, Production and Protection Database to data on antidumping investigations, outcomes and imports at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) product level from the Global Antidumping Database. Our econometric analysis is to estimate a two-stage model of the industry-level decision to pursue an antidumping investigation and the national government ' s decision of whether and how much antidumping import protection to provide. First, we find evidence consistent with the theory of endogenous trade policy: larger industries that face substantial import competition are more likely to pursue an antidumping investigation, and larger and more concentrated industries receive greater antidumping protection from imports. Second, we find that industries that use antidumping are more likely to face the changing economic conditions specified by the technical evidentiary criteria of the WTO Antidumping Agreement: industries that face rapidly falling import prices are more likely to pursue an investigation, and industries that are more susceptible to cyclical dumping due to greater capital investment expenditures and that face rapidly increasing competition from imports receive greater antidumping protection.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 4014.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4014

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Keywords: Free Trade Water and Industry Economic Theory & Research Globalization and Financial Integration Trade Law

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  1. Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34, pages 515-555. [Downloadable!]
  2. James P. Durling, 2003. "Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Measures," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 125-153, March.
  3. Joseph F. Francois & Gunnar Niels, 2004. "Political Influence in a New Antidumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-011/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Global antidumping database version 1.0," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3737, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Whyare so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Heckman, James J, 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 153-61, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eymann, Angelika & Schuknecht, Ludger, 1991. "Antidumping enforcement in the European Community," Policy Research Working Paper Series 743, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Robert Staiger & Frank Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," International Trade 9410004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Hansen, Wendy L & Prusa, Thomas J, 1997. "The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 230-45, May.
  11. Messerlin, Patrick A & Reed, Geoffrey, 1995. "Antidumping Policies in the United States and the European Community," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(433), pages 1565-75, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Bown, Chad P., 2003. "Antidumping and retaliation threats," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 591-611, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Gallaway, Michael P. & Blonigen, Bruce A. & Flynn, Joseph E., 1999. "Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-244, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Prusa, Thomas J., 1992. "Why are so many antidumping petitions withdrawn?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1-2), pages 1-20, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Anti-dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?," The World Economy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 403-433, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Michael O. Moore, 2006. "An Econometric Analysis of U.S. Antidumping Sunset Review Decisions," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 122-150, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Knetter, Michael M. & Prusa, Thomas J., 2003. "Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence from four countries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-17, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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