In the European Community (EC), as in the United States,"injury"is what antidumping is all about. Antidumping laws are a flexible tool for preventing imports from displacing domestic production in politically influential industries. The vehicle for achieving that goal in the EC, however, is not protectionist rules, as in the United States, but protectionist discretion. The empirical results of this study have implications for EC trade policy after 1992. If protectionist interests demand compensation for the abolition of national protectionist barriers after 1992, EC antidumping measures offer them considerable scope for achieving their goals since measures are largely determined by political discretion. Antidumping measures could therefore become a pinnacle of"Fortress Europe". The results also suggest certain strategic considerations for the trade policy of developing countries. The authors argue that antidumping measures affecting developing countries are concentrated in industries with shifting comparative advantage, such as steel products, basic chemicals, and synthetic fibers. And such protection is more likely in sectors with strong, politically influential interest groups.
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