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Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization

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Author Info
Simon P. Anderson () (Department of Economics, 218 Wilson, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904.)
Nicolas Schmitt () (Department of Economics, 8888 University Drive, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby BC V5A 1S6, Canada.)

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Abstract

This article shows that governments have no incentive to introduce nontariff barriers (NTBs) when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. Quotas are preferred to antidumping restrictions so that the model is consistent with a progression from using tariffs only to quotas and then to antidumping constraints (when quotas are eliminated). There is a corresponding narrowing of the range of industries affected by trade restrictions. Simulating the model, the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of tariffs by NTBs are shown to depend on industry characteristics in line with stylized facts. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 41 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 80-97
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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:41:y:2003:i:1:p:80-97

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 449-66, July.
  2. James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Robert Baldwin & Jeffrey Steagall, 1994. "An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 130(2), pages 290-308, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marvel, Howard P & Ray, Edward J, 1983. "The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 190-97, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Cassing, James H. & Hillman, Arye L., 1985. "Political influence motives and the choice between tariffs and quotas," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 279-290, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Anderson, James E., 1993. "Domino dumping II: Anti-dumping," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 133-150, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. James Nieberding, 1999. "The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 65-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995. "Protection and the Business Cycle," Discussion Papers 1130, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Baldwin, Robert E., 1984. "Trade policies in developed countries," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 571-619 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Fischer, Ronald D., 1992. "Endogenous probability of protection and firm behavior," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-2), pages 149-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Gallaway, Michael P. & Blonigen, Bruce A. & Flynn, Joseph E., 1999. "Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-244, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Krishna, Kala, 1989. "Trade restrictions as facilitating practices," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 251-270, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Kaempfer, William H & Marks, Stephen V & Willett, Thomas D, 1988. "Why Do Large Countries Prefer Quantitative Trade Restrictions?," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(4), pages 625-46.
  14. Deardorff, Alan V., 1987. "Why do governments prefer nontariff barriers?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 191-216, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Rosendorff, B Peter, 1996. "Voluntary Export Restraints, Antidumping Procedure, and Domestic Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 544-61, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. repec:att:wimass:199511 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Anderson, Simon P. & Schmitt, Nicolas & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1995. "Who benefits from antidumping legislation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 321-337, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Brian R. Copeland, 1990. "Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable and Non-negotiable Trade Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 84-108, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Ray, Edward John, 1981. "The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(1), pages 105-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Falvey, Rodney E & Lloyd, P J, 1991. "Uncertainty and the Choice of Protective Instrument," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(3), pages 463-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Brander, James A., 1981. "Intra-industry trade in identical commodities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Anderson, James E, 1992. "Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 65-83, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. McCulloch, Rachel, 1987. "Why do governments prefer nontariff barriers? A comment on deardorff," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 217-221, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michael Moore & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?," ECARES Working Papers 2008_024, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Ecares. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2005. "Tariff Liberalization and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?," International Trade 0501001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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