Why do governments prefer nontariff barriers?
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.
Volume (Year): 26 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jme
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- Simon P. Anderson & Nicolas Schmitt, 2000.
"Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization,"
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340, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Melitz, Marc, 2005.
"When and How Should Infant Industries Be Protected?,"
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- Melitz, Marc J., 2005. "When and how should infant industries be protected?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 177-196, May.
- Andrew Dick, 1995. "Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating (Forthcoming in Review of International Economics)," UCLA Economics Working Papers 730, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Hoekman, Bernard & Mavroidis, Petros C., 1995. "The World Trade Organization's agreement on government procurement : expanding disciplines, declining membership?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1429, The World Bank.
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