# Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

## Author Info

• Masaki Aoyagi

()

## Abstract

This paper studies repeated games with imperfect private monitoring when there exists a third-party mediator who coordinates play by giving non-binding instructions to players on which action to take and by collecting their private information. The paper presents a Nash-threat folk theorem for a communication equilibrium based on such mediation when monitoring is jointly $\epsilon$ -perfect in the sense that every player is almost perfectly monitored collectively by other players. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-003-0436-6

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

## Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (02)
Pages: 455-475

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:455-475

Contact details of provider:

Order Information:

## Related research

Keywords: Repeated games; Private monitoring; Joint monitoring; Communication; Mediation.;

## References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

## Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
1. MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, . "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
2. Tim Reuter, 2013. "Endogenous Cartel Organization and Antitrust Fine Discrimination," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-09, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
3. Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2004. "Antidumping: Welfare Enhancing Retaliation?," MPRA Paper 5416, University Library of Munich, Germany.

## Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

## Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:25:y:2005:i:2:p:455-475. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.