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Enforcement, private political pressure and the GATT/WTO escape clause

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Author Info
Bagwell,K.
Staiger,R.W. (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

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File URL: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/archive/wp2004-23.pdf
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Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 23.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:200423

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2001. "Reciprocity, non-discrimination and preferential agreements in the multilateral trading system," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 281-325, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Athey, Susan & Bagwell, Kyle, 2001. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 428-65, Autumn.
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  3. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell & Chris Sanchirico, 1998. "Collusion and Price Rigidity," Working papers 98-23, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-37, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 55(4), pages 829-857, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Baldwin, Richard, 1987. "Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Robert C. Feenstra & Tracy R. Lewis, 1987. "Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure," NBER Working Papers 2374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 574-601, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. R. W. Staiger & G. Tabellini, 1999. "Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 109-144, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kyle Bagwell, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements and Private Information," NBER Working Papers 14812, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bown, Chad P. & Bernard M., Hoekman, 2007. "Developing countries and enforcement of trade agreements : why dispute settlement is not enough," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4450, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Horn, Henrik & Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Robert, 2007. "Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 6037, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Sergei Guriev & Mikhail Klimenko, 2007. "Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements," Working Papers WP13_2007_09, Laboratory for Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2009. "Breach, Remedies and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 15460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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