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The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape

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  • Rosendorff, B. Peter
  • Milner, Helen V.

Abstract

International institutions differ greatly in their forms; the numberof states included, the decision-making mechanisms, the range of issuescovered, the degree of centralized control, and the extent ofexibility within them all vary substantially from one institution to thenext. What accounts for such variation? In this article, as part of thelarger Rational Design project on the design of internationalinstitutions, we claim that such variation can be accounted for as partof the rational, selfinterested behavior of states. We show that atleast one important aspect of institutional design can be explained as arational response of states to their environment.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal International Organization.

Volume (Year): 55 (2001)
Issue (Month): 04 (September)
Pages: 829-857

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Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:55:y:2001:i:04:p:829-857_44

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Cited by:
  1. Robert Brown, 2010. "Measuring Delegation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 141-175, June.
  2. Heinz Hauser & Alexander Roitinger, 2002. "A Renegotiation Perspective on Transatlantic Trade Disputes," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 2002-09, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  3. Bowen, Renee, 2011. "Forbearance in Optimal Multilateral Trade Agreements," Research Papers 2085, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  4. Alexander Keck, 2012. "Soo Yeon Kim. 2010. Power and the governance of global trade: From the GATT to the WTO (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 239-246, June.
  5. Boockmann, Bernhard & Thurner, Paul W., 2002. "Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Treaties," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-44, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  6. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause," NBER Working Papers 10987, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Rahul Mukherji, 2002. "Governing The Taxation Of Digitized Trade," ASARC Working Papers 2002-05, The Australian National University, Australia South Asia Research Centre.
  8. Andy Thorpe & Catherine Robinson, 2004. "When goliaths clash: US and EU differences over the labeling of food products derived from genetically modified organisms," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 287-298, January.
  9. Nathan Jensen, 2007. "International institutions and market expectations: Stock price responses to the WTO ruling on the 2002 U.S. steel tariffs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 261-280, September.
  10. Andrea Gerlak & Jonathan Lautze & Mark Giordano, 2011. "Water resources data and information exchange in transboundary water treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 179-199, May.
  11. Mareike Kleine, 2013. "Knowing your limits: Informal governance and judgment in the EU," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 245-264, June.
  12. Simon Schropp, 2007. "Revisiting the "Compliance-vs.-Rebalancing" Debate in WTO Scholarship a Unified Research Agenda," IHEID Working Papers 29-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Dec 2007.
  13. Ronald Fischer & Martín Osorio, 2002. "Why Do We Need Antidumping Rules?," Documentos de Trabajo 134, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  14. Tadashi Ito, 2007. "NAFTA and productivity convergence between Mexico and the US," IHEID Working Papers 26-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised 27 Nov 2007.
  15. Hefeker, Carsten, 2003. "Handels- und Finanzarchitektur im Umbruch: Globale Integration und die institutionelle Arbeitsteilung von IWF, Weltbank und WTO," HWWA Discussion Papers 225, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
  16. Bown, Chad P., 2014. "Trade policy instruments over time," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6757, The World Bank.
  17. Thomas Bernauer & Anna Kalbhenn & Vally Koubi & Gabriele Spilker, 2013. "Is there a “Depth versus Participation” dilemma in international cooperation?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 477-497, December.

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