International institutions differ greatly in their forms; the numberof states included, the decision-making mechanisms, the range of issuescovered, the degree of centralized control, and the extent ofexibility within them all vary substantially from one institution to thenext. What accounts for such variation? In this article, as part of thelarger Rational Design project on the design of internationalinstitutions, we claim that such variation can be accounted for as partof the rational, selfinterested behavior of states. We show that atleast one important aspect of institutional design can be explained as arational response of states to their environment.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Volume (Year): 55 (2001) Issue (Month): 04 (November) Pages: 829-857 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)