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Why are safeguards under the WTO so unpopular?

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  • BOWN, CHAD P.

Abstract

In recent years, more countries have increasingly turned to explicit, codified trade policy instruments of the international trading system such as antidumping measures. Countries have also increasingly participated in the institutions established to facilitate trade in the international system, such as the WTO s Dispute Settlement Understanding. Given these phenomena, a natural question to consider is why haven t countries resorted to the WTO s safeguards provisions at a similar pace? This paper focuses on the economic incentives generated by reforms in the Uruguay Round, and argues that in order to address the relative unpopularity of the application of safeguards measures, further reforms must be made to WTO s Antidumping Agreement and the rules of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal World Trade Review.

Volume (Year): 1 (2002)
Issue (Month): 01 (March)
Pages: 47-62

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Handle: RePEc:cup:wotrrv:v:1:y:2002:i:01:p:47-62_00

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Cited by:
  1. Chad P. Bown, 2004. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 434, Econometric Society.
  2. Beshkar, Mostafa, 2010. "Trade skirmishes safeguards: A theory of the WTO dispute settlement process," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 35-48, September.
  3. Douglas A. Irwin, 2003. "Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in U.S. Section 201 Cases," NBER Working Papers 9815, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Bown, Chad P. & McCulloch, Rachel, 2009. "U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China trade conflict : export growth, reciprocity, and the international trading system," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5102, The World Bank.
  5. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank.
  6. Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Economics Working Papers 914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008.

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