The Politics of WTO Enforcement Mechanisms
AbstractThis paper analyzes the influence of domestic political considerations by disputing governments on the WTO enforcement outcome, following a violation ruling against the defendant. Since a different mix of import or export sectors in the disputing countries will benefit from the alternative enforcement outcomes â€“ compliance, compensation, retaliation, and the status quo, they become competing forces that steer the strategic interactions between the disputing governments. This paper first studies the complainantâ€™s retaliation capacity and strategy in formulating the retaliation list, and then examines the scope of settlement possibilities between the disputing parties. The results of the paper provide a synopsis of the disputing governmentsâ€™ political payoffs under the alternative enforcement scenarios and the conditions that determine the outcome of the implementation
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings with number 117.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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More information through EDIRC
trade sanction; enforcement failure; compliance; compensation; political economy;
Other versions of this item:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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