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How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel

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  • Chad Bown

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Abstract

Use of temporary trade barriers (TTBs) has proliferated across countries, industries, and even policy instruments. We construct a panel of bilateral, product-level US steel imports that are matched to a unique data set on trade policy exclusions that are associated with the 2002 US steel safeguard in order to compare the trade impacts that result from application of various TTB policies over 1989–2003. We find that the trade effects of an applied safeguard—which is statutorily expected to follow the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment—can nevertheless compare closely to the application of the explicitly discriminatory antidumping policy. Our results on trade policy substitutability complement other recent research on these increasingly important forms of import protection. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 42 (2013)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
Pages: 449-481

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Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:42:y:2013:i:4:p:449-481

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336

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Keywords: Safeguards; Antidumping; Countervailing duties ; Temporary trade barriers; MFN; F13;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2012. "Import protection, business cycles, and exchange rates : evidence from the great recession," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6038, The World Bank.
  2. Bruce Blonigen & Benjamin H. Liebman & Justin R. Pierce & Wesley W. Wilson, 2010. "Are All Trade Protection Policies Created Equal? Empirical Evidence for Nonequivalent Market Power Effects of Tariffs and Quotas," NBER Working Papers 16391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Chad P. Bown & Baybars Karacaovali & Patricia Tovar, 2014. "What Do We Know About Preferential Trade Agreements and Temporary Trade Barriers?," Working Papers 201418, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  4. Bruce A. Blonigen & Benjamin H. Liebman & Justin R. Pierce & Wesley W. Wilson, 2012. "Are all trade policies created equal? empirical evidence for nonequivalent market power effects of tariffs and quotas," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-17, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Chad P. Bown, 2010. "China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement," NBER Chapters, in: China's Growing Role in World Trade, pages 281-337 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Gary D. Libecap, 2013. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," NBER Working Papers 19501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank.
  8. Chad P. Bown & Meredith Crowley & Rachel McCulloch & Daisuke J. Nakima, 2005. "The U.S. trade deficit: made in China?," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q IV, pages 2-18.
  9. Bown, Chad P., 2009. "The global resort to antidumping, safeguards, and other trade remedies amidst the economic crisis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5051, The World Bank.
  10. Bruce A. Blonigen & Benjamin H. Liebman & Wesley W. Wilson, 2007. "Trade Policy and Market Power: The Case of the US Steel Industry," NBER Working Papers 13671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Gary D. Libecap, 2014. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 424-79, June.

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