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Are All Trade Protection Policies Created Equal? Empirical Evidence for Nonequivalent Market Power Effects of Tariffs and Quotas

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  • Bruce Blonigen
  • Benjamin Liebman
  • Justin Pierce
  • Wesley Wilson

Abstract

The steel industry has been protected by a wide variety of trade policies, both tariff- and quota-based, over the past decades. This extensive heterogeneity in trade protection provides the opportunity to examine the well-established theoretical literature predicting nonequivalent effects of tariffs and quotas on domestic firms' market power. Robust to a variety of empirical specifications with U.S. Census data on the population of U.S. steel plants from 1967-2002, we find evidence for significant market power effects for binding quota-based protection, but not for tariff-based protection. There is only weak evidence that antidumping protection increases market power.

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File URL: ftp://ftp2.census.gov/ces/wp/2010/CES-WP-10-27.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau in its series Working Papers with number 10-27.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cen:wpaper:10-27

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Keywords: Market structure; Nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas; VRAs; Antidumping; Mini-mills;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Chad Bown, 2013. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 449-481, June.
  2. Allan Collard-Wexler & Jan De Loecker, 2013. "Reallocation and Technology: Evidence From The U.S. Steel Industry," Working Papers, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau 13-06, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  3. Bruce Blonigen & Benjamin Liebman & Wesley Wilson, 2013. "Antidumping and Production-Line Exit: The Case of the US Steel Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 395-413, June.

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