Steel Protection in the 1980s: The Waning Influens of Big Steel?
In: The Political Economy of American Trade Policy
AbstractThe U.S. integrated steel industry has been very successful in securing import protection over the last 20 years. Critical to that success has been a cohesive coalition of steel producers, the steelworkers' union and 'steel-town' congressional representatives. The political strength of this coalition has diminished substantially over the last decade as the integrated steel industry has restructured and as domestic minimills have played an increasingly important role in the U.S. steel sector. In addition, an effective domestic coalition of steel-using industries acted as a critical counterweight beginning with the fight over a VRA extension in 1989. After 1989, quotas on steel were non-binding and the industry was largely unsuccessful in obtaining antidumping duties in its 1993 unfair trade petitions. These factors point to a diminished ability of the integrated steel industry to obtain special trade agreements in the future.
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- Michael O. Moore, 1994. "Steel Protection in the 1980s: The Waning Influence of Big Steel?," NBER Working Papers 4760, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Bruce Blonigen & Benjamin H. Liebman & Justin R. Pierce & Wesley W. Wilson, 2010.
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NBER Working Papers
16391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Blonigen, Bruce A. & Liebman, Benjamin H. & Pierce, Justin R. & Wilson, Wesley W., 2013. "Are all trade protection policies created equal? Empirical evidence for nonequivalent market power effects of tariffs and quotas," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 369-378.
- Bruce Blonigen & Benjamin Liebman & Justin Pierce & Wesley Wilson, 2010. "Are All Trade Protection Policies Created Equal? Empirical Evidence for Nonequivalent Market Power Effects of Tariffs and Quotas," Working Papers 10-27, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
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