Foreign Subsidization and Excess Capacity
AbstractThe U.S. steel industry has long held that foreign subsidization and excess capacity has led to its long-run demise, yet no one has formally examined this hypothesis. In this paper, we incorporate foreign subsidization considerations into a model based on Staiger and Wolak’s (1992) cyclical-dumping framework and illustrate testable implications of both cyclical excess capacity and structural excess capacity stemming from foreign subsidization. We then use detailed product- and foreign country-level data on steel exports to the U.S. market from 1979 through 2002 to estimate these excess capacity effects. The results provide strong evidence of both cyclical and structural excess capacity effects for exports to the U.S. market. However, the effects are confined to such a narrow range of country-product combinations that it is unlikely that such effects were a significant factor in the fortunes of U.S. steel firms over the past decades.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11798.
Date of creation: Nov 2005
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Other versions of this item:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-01 (All new papers)
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