IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v49y2016i3p1125-1152.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Import dynamics and demands for protection

Author

Listed:
  • Russell Hillberry
  • Phillip McCalman

Abstract

What kinds of changes in foreign competition lead domestic industries to seek import protection? To address this question, we use detailed monthly US import data to investigate changes in import composition during a 24-month window immediately preceding the filing of a petition for import protection. A decomposition methodology allows a comparison of imports from two groups of countries supplying the same product: those that are named in the petition and those that are not. The same decomposition can be applied to products quite similar to the imports in question, but not subject to a petition. The results suggest that industries typically seek protection when faced with a specific pattern of shocks. First, a persistent positive relative supply shock favours imports from named countries. Second, a negative demand shock hits imports from all sources just prior to domestic industries petition for protection. The relative supply shock is a broad one; it applies both to named commodities and to the comparison product group. The import demand shock, by contrast, is narrow, hitting only named products. This negative import demand shock appears to be a key event in the run-up to the filing of a petition. This latter shock has been missed by previous studies using more aggregated data.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Hillberry & Phillip McCalman, 2016. "Import dynamics and demands for protection," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(3), pages 1125-1152, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:49:y:2016:i:3:p:1125-1152
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12227
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/caje.12227
    Download Restriction: access restricted to subscribers

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/caje.12227?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hummels, David L. & Schaur, Georg, 2010. "Hedging price volatility using fast transport," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 15-25, September.
    2. James C. Hartigan, 1996. "Predatory Dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 228-239, February.
    3. Kamal Saggi & Nese Sara, 2018. "National Treatment At The Wto: The Roles Of Product And Country Heterogeneity," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 3, pages 46-75, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1994. "Measuring Industry-Specific Protection: Antidumping in the United States," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(1994 Micr), pages 51-118.
    5. Andrew Gelman & Guido Imbens, 2013. "Why ask Why? Forward Causal Inference and Reverse Causal Questions," NBER Working Papers 19614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Debaere, Peter, 2010. "Small fish–big issues: the effect of trade policy on the global shrimp market," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 353-374, April.
    7. Hillberry, Russell H. & McDaniel, Christine A., 2002. "A Decomposition of North American Trade Growth since NAFTA," Working Papers 15866, United States International Trade Commission, Office of Economics.
    8. Robert C. Feenstra, 1997. "The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feen97-1, March.
    9. Pindyck, Robert S & Rotemberg, Julio J, 1987. "Are Imports to Blame? Attribution of Injury under the 1974 Trade Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 101-122, April.
    10. Chor, Davin & Manova, Kalina, 2012. "Off the cliff and back? Credit conditions and international trade during the global financial crisis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 117-133.
    11. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1990. "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 779-795, September.
    12. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Profit Shifting And Trade Agreements In Imperfectly Competitive Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1067-1104, November.
    13. Jozef Konings & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2013. "Antidumping protection hurts exporters: firm-level evidence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 149(2), pages 295-320, June.
    14. Kelly, Kenneth, 1988. "The Analysis of Causality in Escape Clause Cases," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 187-207, December.
    15. Staiger, Robert W. & Wolak, Frank A., 1992. "The effect of domestic antidumping law in the presence of foreign monopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 265-287, May.
    16. Feenstra, Robert C. (ed.), 1997. "The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226239514, December.
    17. Michael M. Knetter & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence from four countries," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 8, pages 153-169, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    18. Kamal Saggi, 2018. "Preferential Trade Agreements And Multilateral Tariff Cooperation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Economic Analysis of the Rules and Regulations of the World Trade Organization, chapter 6, pages 127-155, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    19. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    20. Benjamin H. Liebman & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006. "The returns from rent-seeking: campaign contributions, firm subsidies and the Byrd Amendment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1345-1369, November.
    21. Clarida, Richard H, 1993. "Entry, Dumping, and Shakeout," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 180-202, March.
    22. Hillberry, Russell & Hummels, David, 2008. "Trade responses to geographic frictions: A decomposition using micro-data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 527-550, April.
    23. Pierce, Justin R., 2011. "Plant-level responses to antidumping duties: Evidence from U.S. manufacturers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 222-233.
    24. Hansen, Wendy L., 1990. "The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 21-46, March.
    25. Grossman, Gene M., 1986. "Imports as a cause of injury: The case of the U.S. steel industry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3-4), pages 201-223, May.
    26. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Wilson, Wesley W., 2010. "Foreign subsidization and excess capacity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 200-211, March.
    27. David Hummels & Peter J. Klenow, 2005. "The Variety and Quality of a Nation's Exports," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 704-723, June.
    28. Robert C. Feenstra, 1997. "Introduction to "The Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies"," NBER Chapters, in: The Effects of US Trade Protection and Promotion Policies, pages 1-7, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    29. Krupp, Corinne, 1994. "Antidumping Cases in the U.S. Chemical Industry: A Panel Data Approach," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 299-311, September.
    30. Feinberg, Robert M., 1989. "Imports as a threat to cartel stability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 281-288, June.
    31. Werner Baer & Malcolm Gillis, 1981. "Export Diversification and the New Protectionism: The Experiences of Latin America," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number baer81-1, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kuenzel, David J., 2020. "WTO tariff commitments and temporary protection: Complements or substitutes?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    2. Phillip McCalman & Frank Stähler & Gerald Willmann, 2019. "Contingent trade policy and economic efficiency," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(2), pages 227-255, May.
    3. Chrysostomos Tabakis & Maurizio Zanardi, 2017. "Antidumping Echoing," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(2), pages 655-681, April.
    4. Zurita, Carlos A., 2022. "Is The Gravity Model a Power Law?: Evidence from Colombia," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322368, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chad Bown, 2013. "How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies Toward Steel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(4), pages 449-481, June.
    2. Vandenbussche, Hylke & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2010. "The chilling trade effects of antidumping proliferation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 760-777, August.
    3. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hylke Vandenbussche & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "What explains the proliferation of antidumping laws? [‘Antidumping Laws in the US; Use and Welfare Consequences’]," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 23(53), pages 94-138.
    5. Bruce A. Blonigen & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2004. "Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Antidumping Policy: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 134-154, March.
    6. Bown, Chad P., 2004. "Trade disputes and the implementation of protection under the GATT: an empirical assessment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 263-294, March.
    7. Jozef Konings & Hylke Vandenbussche & Linda Springael, 2001. "Import Diversion under European Antidumping Policy," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 283-299, September.
    8. Bruce A. Blonigen & Benjamin H. Liebman & Wesley W. Wilson, 2007. "Trade Policy and Market Power: The Case of the US Steel Industry," NBER Working Papers 13671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Crowley, Meredith A., 2006. "Do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-484, March.
    10. Ludema, Rodney D., 2002. "Increasing returns, multinationals and geography of preferential trade agreements," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 329-358, March.
    11. Meredith A. Crowley, 2007. "Cyclical dumping and U.S. antidumping protection: 1980-2001," Working Paper Series WP-07-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    12. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2006. "Policy externalities: How US antidumping affects Japanese exports to the EU," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 696-714, September.
    13. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 317-390, Elsevier.
    14. Maya Cohen-Meidan, 2013. "The Heterogeneous Effects of Trade Protection: A Study of US Antidumping Duties on Portland Cement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(4), pages 369-394, June.
    15. Jozef Konings & Hylke Vandenbussche, 2004. "Antidumping Protection and Markups of Domestic Firms: Evidence from Firm Level Data," LICOS Discussion Papers 14104, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
    16. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2007. "Trade deflection and trade depression," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 176-201, May.
    17. Chad P. Bown, 2010. "China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement," NBER Chapters, in: China's Growing Role in World Trade, pages 281-337, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Bown, Chad P. & Crowley, Meredith A., 2014. "Emerging economies, trade policy, and macroeconomic shocks," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 261-273.
    19. Michel DE VROEY, 2013. "What can civil society expect from academic macroeconomics?," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2013022, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    20. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:49:y:2016:i:3:p:1125-1152. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Prof. Werner Antweiler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ceaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.