Trade and Domestic Policy Linkage in International Agreements
AbstractA central question in discussions of integrating negotiations over domestic policy (e.g., environmental policy or labor standards) into traditional trade agreements is the degree to which the trade policy and domestic policy provisions of an agreement should be explicitly linked. For example, should the World Trade Organization enforce domestic policy obligations with the threat of the suspension of trade concessions' This article considers the conditions under which linking trade and domestic policy agreements within a self-enforcing agreement is beneficial, and argues that the benefits of such policy linkage may be lower than is commonly thought. Copyright 2002 by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 43 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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