Incentives and Institutions. A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy
AbstractThis paper comments and assesses “Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures”, a paper that David Victor presented at the international workshop on "Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World", organized by Joe Aldy and Rob Stavins at the J.F. Kennedy School of Government in May 2006. By analyzing Victor’s proposals for an effective climate agreement post 2012, this paper emphasizes the contribution that game-theoretical analyses have provided to the design of climate agreements. It therefore emphasizes how incentives and institutions play a crucial role in affecting the final outcome of negotiations on climate change control, and how incentives and institutions can be modified to achieve a better control of climate change. This paper also discusses a wider policy approach that can enhance the effectiveness of measures designed to address the climate change problem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 2006_49.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published
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Postal: Cannaregio, S. Giobbe no 873 , 30121 Venezia
Web page: http://www.unive.it/dip.economia
More information through EDIRC
Agreements; Climate; Incentives; Negotiations; Policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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