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Trade Bloc Formation Under Imperfect Competition Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Conconi, P.
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We examine the endogenous formation of trade blocs when markets are characterized by imperfect competition and governments use import tariffs and export subsidies to alter the strategic interactions between oligopolistic firms. Using a simple model of intra-industry trade between three ex-ante symmetric countries, we find that, while 'pure' customs unions - entailing tariff cooperation only - are stepping stones towards global free trade, 'impure' customs unions - involving the coordinated use of both tariffs and subsidies - are stumbling blocs against it.
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Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number
571.
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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 2000Date of revision:
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Keywords: COMPETITION ; TRADE ; TARIFFS ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
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