Many arguments about decentralization in public goods provision have testable implications for the relationship between decentralization and the level and spatial variability of public goods. This paper explores the empirical relationship between decentralization and environmental public good, water quality in rivers at monitoring stations around the world. It examines pollution levels and spatial variability of pollution within a country for both a local and a regional pollutant. The results suggest higher pollution levels with greater decentralization when fixed effects are included; the evidence is strongest for the regional pollutant, where it might result from interjurisdictional free riding. Federalism is associated with greater spatial variability in pollution within a country, consistent with the traditional view that decentralization allows policies more tailored to local conditions.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number
13098.
Length: Date of creation: May 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13098
Note: PE EEE Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. Phone: 617-868-3900 Email: Web page: http://www.nber.org More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Carson, Richard T. & Hanemann, W. Michael, 2006.
"Contingent Valuation,"
Handbook of Environmental Economics,
in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 17, pages 821-936
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)