Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies
AbstractMost US federal environmental policies allow states to assume responsibility for implementation and enforcement of regulations; states with this responsibility are referred to as âauthorizedâ or having âprimacy.â Although such decentralization may have benefits, it may also have costs with pollution spillovers across states. This paper estimates these costs empirically by studying the free riding of states authorized under the Clean Water Act. The analysis examines water quality in rivers around the US and includes fixed effects for the location where water quality is monitored to address unobserved geographic heterogeneity. The estimated equations show a 4% degradation of water quality downstream of authorized states, with an environmental cost downstream of $17 million annually.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 50 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
Other versions of this item:
- Hilary Sigman, 2004. "Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies," Departmental Working Papers 200416, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Hilary Sigman, 2004. "Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies," NBER Working Papers 10717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2002.
"‘Optimal’ Pollution Abatement – Whose Benefits Matter, and How Much?,"
NCEE Working Paper Series
200205, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised Sep 2002.
- Gray, Wayne B. & Shadbegian, R.J.Ronald J., 2004. "'Optimal' pollution abatement--whose benefits matter, and how much?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 510-534, May.
- Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2002. "Optimal Pollution Abatement - Whose Benefits Matter, and How Much?," NBER Working Papers 9125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Levinson, Arik, 2003. "Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report and Some New Evidence," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 56(1), pages 91-106, March.
- Arik Levinson, 2002. "Environmental Regulatory Competition: A Status Report and Some New Evident," Working Papers gueconwpa~02-02-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Hilary Sigman, 2002.
"International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do Countries Free Ride?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1152-1159, September.
- Hilary Sigman, 2001. "International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do Countries Free Ride?," NBER Working Papers 8585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hilary Sigman, 2001. "International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do Countries Free Ride?," Departmental Working Papers 200111, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Revesz, Richard L. & Stavins, Robert N., 2007. "Environmental Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
- Helland, Eric & Whitford, Andrew B., 2003. "Pollution incidence and political jurisdiction: evidence from the TRI," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 403-424, November.
- Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
- Hilary Sigman, 2003.
"Letting States do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
9451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sigman, Hilary, 2003. "Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 56(1), pages 107-22, March.
- Hilary Sigman, 2002. "Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation," Departmental Working Papers 200228, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- John A. List & Shelby Gerking, 2000. "Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 453-471.
- Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd & Sargent, Keith, 1997. "A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulphur versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(254), pages 281-301, May.
- James R. Markusen & Edward R. Morey & Nancy Olewiler, 1992. "Noncooperative Equilibria in Regional Environmental Policies When Plant Locations are Endogenous," NBER Working Papers 4051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kahn, Matthew E., 2004. "Domestic pollution havens: evidence from cancer deaths in border counties," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 51-69, July.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.