Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation
AbstractUnder most U.S. environmental regulations, the federal government shares responsibility with the states by authorizing them to implement and enforce federal policies. Authorization provides states with considerable discretion over the effects of regulation and is perhaps the most significant decentralization in U.S. environmental policy. However, few studies address its role. To fill this gap, this paper explores the empirical determinants of authorization for water pollution and hazardous waste regulation. Although no single hypothesis strongly explains authorization, I find some evidence that states authorize to increase the stringency of regulation, which suggests that environmental decentralization would be beneficial.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by National Tax Association in its journal National Tax Journal.
Volume (Year): 56 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Other versions of this item:
- Hilary Sigman, 2002. "Letting States Do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation," Departmental Working Papers 200228, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Hilary Sigman, 2003. "Letting States do the Dirty Work: State Responsibility for Federal Environmental Regulation," NBER Working Papers 9451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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