Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

State enforcement of federal standards: Implications for interstate pollution

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hutchinson, Emma
  • Kennedy, Peter W.

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between interstate air pollution and the division of power between federal and state agencies in setting and enforcing standards. In the context of the US Clean Air Act we argue that the EPA is able to monitor the adoption of technology-based standards more closely than it can monitor state-level enforcement, and that this causes an effective division of control between federal and state agencies. Our analysis offers three main insights into the interstate pollution problem in this setting. First, states have an incentive to enforce standards less stringently on firms located close to downwind borders, and this leads to excessive interstate pollution in equilibrium. Second, there can arise an inherent substitutability in the regulatory problem between strict standards and compliance effort, and this creates a strategic linkage between the federal policy on standards and state policies on enforcement. In particular, a tighter federal standard can induce less selective enforcement but can also lead to less enforcement overall. Third, states will attempt to neutralize the impact of location-based federal standards (that specifically target interstate pollution) in a way that actually exacerbates the underlying enforcement problem.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VFJ-4RC2RY5-1/1/c9321d3ab90da4e73a9bad8f490afdd3
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 316-344

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:316-344

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  2. David P. Baron, 1985. "Noncooperative Regulation of a Nonlocalized Externality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 553-568, Winter.
  3. Hilary Sigman, 2001. "International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do Countries Free Ride?," Departmental Working Papers 200111, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  4. Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2002. "Optimal Pollution Abatement - Whose Benefits Matter, and How Much?," NBER Working Papers 9125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Harford, Jon D., 2000. "Initial and Continuing Compliance and the Trade-Off between Monitoring and Control Cost," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 151-163, September.
  6. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1996. "Bargaining in Environmental Regulation and the Ideal Regulator," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 233-253, March.
  7. Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999. "Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 415-440, March.
  8. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1998. "Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 225-241, May.
  9. Jones, Carol Adaire & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1990. "The social cost of uniform regulatory standards in a hierarchical government," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-72, July.
  10. Mary E. Deily & Wayne B. Gray, 1989. "Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industry," Working Paper 8912, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  11. Heyes, Anthony, 2000. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 107-29, March.
  12. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  13. Sigman, Hilary, 2005. "Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 82-101, July.
  14. Helland, Eric, 1998. "The Revealed Preferences of State EPAs: Stringency, Enforcement, and Substitution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 242-261, May.
  15. William S. Neilson & Geum Soo Kim, 2001. "A Standard-Setting Agency and Environmental Enforcement," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 757-763, January.
  16. Henk Folmer & Ignazio Musu, 1992. "Transboundary pollution problems, environmental policy and international cooperation: An introduction," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 107-116, March.
  17. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
  18. Helland, Eric & Whitford, Andrew B., 2003. "Pollution incidence and political jurisdiction: evidence from the TRI," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 403-424, November.
  19. Dion, Catherine & Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoit, 1998. "Monitoring of Pollution Regulation: Do Local Conditions Matter?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 5-18, January.
  20. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
  21. Helland, Eric, 2001. "Prosecutorial Discretion at the EPA: Some Evidence on Litigation Strategy," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 271-94, July.
  22. Carol Adaire Jones, 1989. "Standard setting with incomplete enforcement revisited," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(1), pages 72-87.
  23. Silva, Emilson C. D. & Caplan, Arthur J., 1997. "Transboundary Pollution Control in Federal Systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 173-186, October.
  24. Olson, Mary, 1996. "Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 376-407, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. van 't Veld, Klaas & Shogren, Jason F., 2012. "Environmental federalism and environmental liability," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 105-119.
  2. François DESTANDAU & Anne ROZAN & Sandrine SPAETER, 2014. "Supra-Regional vs. Regional Regulators in the Water Pollution Mitigation: Optimal Exemption Policies," Working Papers of BETA 2014-09, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  3. Howard Chang & Hilary Sigman & Leah G. Traub, 2007. "Endogenous Decentralization in Federal Environmental Policies," NBER Working Papers 13238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Millimet, Daniel L., 2013. "Environmental Federalism: A Survey of the Empirical Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 7831, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:316-344. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.