Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking
AbstractIn this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages: When the damages are insignificant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes and the simultaneous-move policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are significant, the tax rates are strategic complements and the sequential-move policymaking emerges. In addition, we extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries. When the differences are large, the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk dominant equilibrium is also that the less vulnerable country leads.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 29337.
Date of creation: 06 Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Strategic environmental policy; Endogenous timing; Environmental tax; Duopoly;
Other versions of this item:
- Keisuke Hattori & Takahiro Kitamura, 2013. "Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(2), pages 199-215, June.
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-03-12 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-03-12 (Environmental Economics)
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