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Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology

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  • Buchholz, Wolfgang
  • Eichenseer, Michael

Abstract

From the perspective of standard public good theory the total amount of greenhouse gas mitigation (or public good supply in general) will be lower in a leader-follower game than in a simultaneous Nash game so that strategic leadership is disadvantageous for climate policy. We show that this need no longer be true when the leading country has the option to employ a technology by which it can reduce its abatement costs and thus improve the productivity of its contribution technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Buchholz, Wolfgang & Eichenseer, Michael, 2017. "Advantageous Leadership in Public Good Provision: The Case of an Endogenous Contribution Technology," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168153, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168153
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    1. (*), Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Buchholz & Kjell Erik Lommerud, 1997. "Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(1), pages 29-43.
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    17. Wolfgang Buchholz & Lisa Dippl & Michael Eichenseer, 2017. "Technological Transfers in Global Climate Policy — A Strategic Perspective," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Anil Markandya & Ibon Galarraga & Dirk Rübbelke (ed.), Climate Finance Theory and Practice, chapter 12, pages 271-295, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    21. Wolfgang Buchholz & Todd Sandler, 2017. "Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision: Incorporating Behavioural Approaches," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 591-607, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brandt, Urs Steiner & Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard, 2022. "Is the annual UNFCCC COP the only game in town?," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    2. Keisuke Hattori & Mai Yamada, 2020. "Effective Leadership Selection in Complementary Teams," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 176(4), pages 620-639.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation

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