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Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements

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  • Kimiko Terai

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    Abstract

    We examine how international coordination among countries generates a trend towards establishing an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating international agreement are a politician’s motive for re-election and a financial mechanism for compliance. If a politician expects another politician in a neighboring country to signal his good performance to his citizen by participating in the agreement, and is aware that his ex post deviation will be deterred by the financial mechanism, he too decides to participate in the agreement, which then corrects externality problems. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-012-9563-5
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

    Volume (Year): 53 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (October)
    Pages: 297-308

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:53:y:2012:i:2:p:297-308

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

    Related research

    Keywords: Enforceability; Financial mechanism; International environmental agreements; Re-election concerns; Time-consistency; D72; H87; P58;

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