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Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements

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  • Amihai Glazer

    () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Stef Proost

    () (Center for Economic Studies, KULeuven)

Abstract

Given that it is difficult to monitor, and even more so to enforce, International Environmental Agreements, it is surprising that they are signed and implemented. This paper offers a theoretical model, which addresses the phenomena. The focus is on informational and coordination problems--a country which is unsure about the benefits of environmental policy may believe that the benefits are higher the greater the number of other countries which lean towards taking action. Whereas each country may individually take no environmental action, in equilibrium several countries may take environmental action if they expect others to. An International Environmental Agreement can thus be self-enforcing. Such effects can appear even if international environmental spillovers are absent, and even if monitoring and enforcement are infeasible. Our approach can explain additional phenomena: why a country that is known to care little about the environment may deeply influence other countries if it takes environmental action, why lags may appear between the signing of an agreement and its implementation, and how requirements for approval by several bodies within a country can increase support for environmental action.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 070810.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:070810

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Keywords: Environmental policy; International agreements; Signaling; Regulation;

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  1. Roelfsema, Hein, 2007. "Strategic delegation of environmental policy making," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 270-275, March.
  2. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
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  8. Murdoch, James C. & Sandler, Todd & Vijverberg, Wim P. M., 2003. "The participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial probit analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 337-362, February.
  9. Baron, David P., 2002. "Private Politics and Private Policy: A Theory of Boycotts," Research Papers 1766, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  10. Guth, W., 1993. "A Simple Justification of Quantity Competition and the Cournot-Oligopoly Solution," Discussion Paper 1993-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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