This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Private Politics and Private Policy: A Theory of Boycotts

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Baron, David P. (Stanford U)
Abstract

Pubic policies such as reguation, antitrust, and international trade are the result of public politics--a competition over who gets what with government the arbiter of that competition. Policies are also chosen by private parties without the command or sanction of government. Private policies often result from pressure from interest groups that can be independent of government. Such activity and the responses to it represent private politics--a competition over who gets what that takes place outside the arenas of government. This paper provides a theory of private politics focusing on an activist that generates a boycott to induce a firm to change its policies. The mode consists of two games. In the first members of the public decide when and how much to boycott the firm based on information they receive. A person's action reveals information, which represents a public good, and that person has an incentive to act early so as to ead others to act. In the second game the activist and the firm bargain to settle the boycott, and the settlement represents a private policy. The equilibrium of the games provides an industrial organization of activist groups, their targets, and the issues that attract boycotts.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/library/RP1766.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1766.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1766

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015
Phone: (650) 723-2146
Fax: (650)725-6750
Email:
Web page: http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1989. "An Outside Option Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(4), pages 753-70, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2002. "On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1477-1517, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Teoh, Siew Hong & Welch, Ivo & Wazzan, C Paul, 1999. "The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(1), pages 35-89, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Gul, Faruk & Lundholm, Russell, 1995. "Endogenous Timing and the Clustering of Agents' Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 1039-66, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, 2000. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 85-118, January.
    Other versions:
  8. David P. Baron, 2003. "Private Politics," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 31-66, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Gupta, Sonam & Innes, Robert, 2008. "Determinants and Impact of Private Politics: An Empirical Analysis," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6238, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  2. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen & Panu Poutvaara, 2008. "Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 070818, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Cannot find something on IDEAS? Encourage the publisher to index it! Instructions.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.