Firms' ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling
AbstractThis paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. To affect a firm's ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care, increasing the disciplinary power of consumer boycotts. In the firm's choice between ethical and unethical behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies depends on the cost of producing ethically. In particular, when the cost is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a prisoners' dilemma as the firm's optimal strategy.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
Firm' s ethical code Consumer morality Boycotts;
Other versions of this item:
- Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen & Panu Poutvaara, 2008. "Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling," CESifo Working Paper Series 2323, CESifo Group Munich.
- Glazer, Amihai & Kanniainen, Vesa & Poutvaara, Panu, 2008. "Firms' Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling," IZA Discussion Papers 3498, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Glazer, Amihai & Kanniainen, Vesa & Poutvaara, Panu, 2010. "Firms’ ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling," Munich Reprints in Economics 20383, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Fabrice Etilé & Sabrina Teyssier, 2013. "Corporate social responsibility and the economics of consumer social responsibility," Review of Agricultural and Environmental Studies - Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 94(2), pages 221-259.
- Etilé, Fabrice & Teyssier, Sabrina, 2013. "Corporate social responsibility and the economics of consumer social responsibility," Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, Editions NecPlus, vol. 2013(02), pages 221-259, June.
- Fabrice Etilé & Sabrina Teyssier, 2012. "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Economics of Consumer Social Responsibility," Working Papers hal-00749355, HAL.
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