Not it: opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good
AbstractMost coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the cost of participating in the coalition. This study tests the predicted sequence of participation decisions in voluntary coalitions using real-time threshold public goods experiments. We find that subjectsâ behavior is more consistent with the theoretical predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition members and free-riding non-members is relatively large. Key Words: voluntary coalitions, voluntary agreements, public goods experiments, free riding
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 142 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Voluntary coalitions; Voluntary agreements; Public goods experiments; Free riding; H41; C92; C72; Q50;
Other versions of this item:
- David M. McEvoy, 2009. "Not It: Opting out of Voluntary Coalitions that Provide a Public Good," Working Papers 09-14, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
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