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How do electoral competition and special interests shape the stringency of renewable energy standards?

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  • Johannes Urpelainen

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10018-011-0020-4
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS in its journal Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.

    Volume (Year): 14 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 23-34

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:14:y:2012:i:1:p:23-34

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    Related research

    Keywords: Renewable energy; Special interests; Policy instruments; Game theory; Political economy; L50; Q54; Q58;

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    1. Cowan, Robin, 1988. "Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study In Technological Lock-In," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 88-33, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    2. Fischer, Carolyn & Newell, Richard, 2004. "Environmental and Technology Policies for Climate Mitigation," Discussion Papers, Resources For the Future dp-04-05, Resources For the Future.
    3. Aidt, T.S.Toke Skovsgaard & Dutta, Jayasri, 2004. "Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 458-479, May.
    4. Lipp, Judith, 2007. "Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 5481-5495, November.
    5. Kawahara, Shinya, 2011. "Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 477-495, September.
    6. Thomas P. Lyon & Haitao Yin, 2010. "Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards?: An Empirical Investigation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 133-158.
    7. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
    8. Christoph Heinzel & Thomas Winkler, 2011. "Economic functioning and politically pragmatic justification of tradable green certificates in Poland," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 13(2), pages 157-175, June.
    9. Laird, Frank N. & Stefes, Christoph, 2009. "The diverging paths of German and United States policies for renewable energy: Sources of difference," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2619-2629, July.
    10. Unruh, Gregory C., 2000. "Understanding carbon lock-in," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(12), pages 817-830, October.
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    Cited by:
    1. Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013. "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.

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