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Renegotiations in the Greenhouse

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  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    ()

  • Rob Dellink
  • Ekko Ierland

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 573-596

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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:45:y:2010:i:4:p:573-596

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

Related research

Keywords: International climate agreements; Self-enforcing international environmental agreements; STACO model; Coalition formation with renegotiation; C73; D74; Q54;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Ciscar, Juan Carlos & Soria, Antonio, 2002. "Prospective analysis of beyond Kyoto climate policy: a sequential game framework," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(15), pages 1327-1335, December.
  2. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9wv3h5jb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  3. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
  4. Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
  5. Alexandro Caparros & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2004. "North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information," Post-Print halshs-00009823, HAL.
  6. Germain, Marc & Toint, Philippe & Tulkens, Henry & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2003. "Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 79-99, October.
  7. Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2006. "Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 19-48, May.
  8. Michael Finus & Ekko Ierland & Rob Dellink, 2006. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 271-291, August.
  9. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October.
  10. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October.
  11. Van Der Ploeg, F. & De Zeeuw, A.J., 1990. "International Aspects Of Pollution Control," Papers 9065, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  12. Hans-Peter Weikard & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2004. "The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements," Working Papers 2004.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  13. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  14. Rob Dellink & Michael Finus & Niels Olieman, 2008. "The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(4), pages 357-377, April.
  15. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  16. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  17. Nagashima, Miyuki & Dellink, Rob & van Ierland, Ekko & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2009. "Stability of international climate coalitions -- A comparison of transfer schemes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1476-1487, March.
  18. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations," Working Papers 2008.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  19. Rubio, S. & Ulph, A., 2002. "A simple dynamic model of international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0209, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  20. Na, Seong-lin & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 173-85, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Leo Wangler & JJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2011. "The Political Economy of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-038, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  2. Birgit Bednar-Friedl, 2012. "Climate policy targets in emerging and industrialized economies: the influence of technological differences, environmental preferences and propensity to save," Empirica, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 191-215, May.
  3. Dellink, Rob & Finus, Michael, 2012. "Uncertainty and climate treaties: Does ignorance pay?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 565-584.

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