International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty
AbstractNegotiations toward international environmental agreements take place under uncertainty. The authors address the process of coalition formation in this context. Coalitions are more likely to form among countries that are similar. Since countries are more likely to be facing similar conditions ex ante rather than ex post (i.e., before the resolution of uncertainty rather than after it), the possibility of coalition formation is enhanced the sooner the negotiations take place. The social value of better scientific information may well be negative in such circumstances. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 50 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://oep.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Charles Kolstad & Alistair Ulph, 2011. "Uncertainty, Learning and Heterogeneity in International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(3), pages 389-403, November.
- Kolstad, Charles D., 2007. "Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 68-79, January.
- Rob Dellink & Michael Finus & Niels Olieman, 2008. "The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(4), pages 357-377, April.
- Gilles Rotillon & Tazdaït Tarik, 2003. "Coopération internationale et problèmes environnementaux globaux : vision normative versus vision positive," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 17(1), pages 101-134.
- Fuhai Hong & Susheng Wang, 2012. "Climate Policy, Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(3), pages 391-411, March.
- Santiago J. Rubio, 2001. "International Cooperation In Pollution Control," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Porchiung Chou & Cheickna Sylla, 2008. "The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 317-341, December.
- Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink & Ekko Ierland, 2010. "Renegotiations in the Greenhouse," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 573-596, April.
- Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2009.
"The Role of Uncertainty and Learning for the Success of International Climate Agreements,"
Stirling Economics Discussion Papers
2009-16, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Finus, Michael & Pintassilgo, Pedro, 2013. "The role of uncertainty and learning for the success of international climate agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 29-43.
- Vincent Boucher & Yann Bramoullé, 2007. "Risk Aversion and International Environmental Agreements," Cahiers de recherche 0739, CIRPEE.
- Hans-Peter Weikard & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2004.
"The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements,"
2004.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Hans-Peter Weikard & Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, 2006. "The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 209-232, April.
- Boucher, Vincent & Bramoullé, Yann, 2010. "Providing global public goods under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 591-603, October.
- Baker, Erin, 2005. "Uncertainty and learning in a strategic environment: global climate change," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 19-40, January.
- Dellink, Rob & Finus, Michael, 2012.
"Uncertainty and climate treaties: Does ignorance pay?,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 565-584.
- Dellink, Rob & Finus, Michael, 2009. "Uncertainty and Climate Treaties: Does Ignorance Pay?," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2009-15, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
- Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo & Alistair Ulph, 2014. "International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion," CESifo Working Paper Series 4589, CESifo Group Munich.
- May Elsayyad & Florian Morath, 2013. "Technology Transfers for Climate Change," CESifo Working Paper Series 4521, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.