Legislative Institutions, Lobbying, and the Endogenous Choice of Regulatory Instruments: A Political Economy Approach to Instrument Choice
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.
Volume (Year): 5 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (Fall)
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- Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013.
"The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey,"
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics,
Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
- Leo Wangler & JJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2011. "The Political Economy of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-038, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Swinnen, Johan F.M., 1997. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Transition," 1997: Economic Transition in Central and East Europe, and the Former Soviet Union: Implications ... Symposium, June 12-14, 1997, Berlin, Germany 50836, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
- Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," Discussion Papers dp-97-25, Resources For the Future.
- Jack, William, 1992. "Power sharing and pollution control : coordinating policies among levels of government," Policy Research Working Paper Series 887, The World Bank.
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