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On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making

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  • Scott Barret

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    Abstract

    International cooperation can be looked at in two ways: as a process and as an outcome. This paper shows how the process of treaty-making can affect treaty outcomes and how treaty design can change the rules of the game of international cooperation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008243528330
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

    Volume (Year): 11 (1998)
    Issue (Month): 3 (April)
    Pages: 317-333

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:11:y:1998:i:3:p:317-333

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

    Related research

    Keywords: game theory; international environmental agreements;

    References

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    1. Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March.
    2. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1994048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-72, June.
    4. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
    5. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1995. "R&D Cooperation and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 1154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
    7. Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
    8. CURRARINI, Sergio & TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Core-theoretic and political stability of international agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers 1997093, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    9. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
    10. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
    11. Murdoch, James C. & Sandler, Todd, 1997. "The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 331-349, February.
    12. Murdoch, James C & Sandler, Todd & Sargent, Keith, 1997. "A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulphur versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(254), pages 281-301, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Alexandre SAUQUET & Antoine CAZALS, 2013. "When does cooperation win and why? Political cycles and participation in international environmental agreements," Working Papers 201320, CERDI.
    2. Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013. "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
    3. David M. McEvoy & John K. Stranlund, 2006. "Enforcing ‘Self-Enforcing’ International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2006-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
    4. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
    5. Arzu Basaran, 2005. "A Method For Strategic Decision Making In A Watershed -Game Theory," ERSA conference papers ersa05p197, European Regional Science Association.
    6. Köke, Sonja & Lange, Andreas, 2013. "Negotiating Environmental Agreements under Ratification Uncertainty," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79952, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Murdoch, James C. & Sandler, Todd & Vijverberg, Wim P. M., 2003. "The participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial probit analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 337-362, February.
    8. Konrad, Kai A. & Thum, Marcel, 2011. "Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-109, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    9. Sönke Hoffmann & Benedikt Mihm & Joachim Weimann, 2014. "To Commit or not to Commit? An Experimental Investigation of Pre-Commitments in Bargaining Situations with Asymmetric Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 4835, CESifo Group Munich.
    10. David McEvoy & John Stranlund, 2009. "Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 42(4), pages 491-508, April.
    11. Mark Zeitoun & Naho Mirumachi, 2008. "Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and cooperation," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 297-316, December.
    12. Morten Søberg, 2000. "Price Expectations and International Quota Trading: An Experimental Evaluation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(3), pages 259-277, November.
    13. Stefan Borsky & Andrea Leiter & Michael Pfaffermayr, 2011. "Does going green pay off? The effect of an international environmental agreement on tropical timber trade," Working Papers 2011-17, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    14. Morten Søberg, 1999. "Asymmetric Information and International Tradable Quota Treaties. An experimental evaluation," Discussion Papers 248, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
    15. Mazzanti, Massimiliano, 2001. "The role of economics in global management of whales: re-forming or re-founding IWC?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 205-221, February.
    16. Urs Steiner Brandt & Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2003. "Hot Air as an Implicit Side Payment Arrangement: Could a Hot Air Provision have Saved the Kyoto-Agreement?," Working Papers 42/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
    17. Jungcurt, Stefan, 2004. "The Politics of Incoherence: A Framework for the Analysis of Functional Overlap in International Governance as Two-Level Game," Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources Discussion Papers 18841, Humboldt University Berlin, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    18. Wietze Lise & Richard Tol, 2004. "Attainability of International Environmental Agreements as a Social Situation," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 253-277, September.

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