Environmental federalism: a proposal of decentralization
AbstractIn a context in which environmental protection have become in an important issue, the paper analyses which would be the optimal division of environmental policymaking functions among the different government levels. From the point of view of the fiscal federalism theory, we will design the most appropriate level of decentralization in each situation. In this sense, a proposal of decentralization has been shown, analyzing the consequences that a lax environmental policy could generate on future generations. Key words: Fiscal federalism, environmental policies, water management. Clasificación JEL: H77, Q25, Q28
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Regional Science Association in its series ERSA conference papers with number ersa04p492.
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Augasse 2-6, 1090 Vienna, Austria
Web page: http://www.ersa.org
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2005-11-09 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2005-11-09 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GEO-2005-11-09 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-PBE-2005-11-09 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peltzman, Sam & Tideman, T Nicolaus, 1972. "Local versus National Pollution Control: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 959-63, December.
- Glazer, Amihai, 1999. "Local regulation may be excessively stringent," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 553-558, September.
- Oates, Wallace E. & Portney, Paul R., 2003.
"The political economy of environmental policy,"
Handbook of Environmental Economics,
in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 325-354
- Daniel L. Millimet & John A. List, 2003. "A Natural Experiment on the 'Race to the Bottom' Hypothesis: Testing for Stochastic Dominance in Temporal Pollution Trends," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 65(4), pages 395-420, 09.
- Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
- Levinson, Arik, 1997. "A Note on Environmental Federalism: Interpreting Some Contradictory Results," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 359-366, July.
- Fredriksson, Per G. & Vollebergh, Herman R. J. & Dijkgraaf, Elbert, 2004. "Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: theory and evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 207-231, March.
- James R. Markusen & Edward R. Morey & Nancy Olewiler, 1991.
"Environmental Policy When Market Structure and Plant Locations are Endo-genous,"
NBER Working Papers
3671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Markusen James R. & Morey Edward R. & Olewiler Nancy D., 1993. "Environmental Policy when Market Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-86, January.
- Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
- List, J.A. & Gerking, S.D., 1996.
"Optimal institutional arrangements for pollution control,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-4742872, Tilburg University.
- List, John A. & Gerking, Shelby D., 1996. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Pollution Control," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 26(1).
- Daniel L. Millimet, 2003. "Assessing the Empirical Impact of Environmental Federalism," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 711-733.
- Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, Daniel L., 2002. "Strategic Interaction and the Determination of Environmental Policy across U.S. States," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 101-122, January.
- Fredriksson, Per G & Gaston, Noel, 2000. "Environmental Governance in Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(3), pages 501-14, July.
- Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
- Oates, Wallace E., 2001. "Fiscal competition and European Union: contrasting perspectives," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 133-145, April.
- Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
- Cropper, Maureen & Laibson, David, 1998. "The implications of hyperbolic discounting for project evaluation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1943, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gunther Maier).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.