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The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence

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  • Daniel McFadden

Abstract

This paper develops a method for inferring, from the consequences or outcomes of organizational decisions, an implicit choice criterion such that the organization behaves as if it were following this decision rule. The method is quantified for the case of a public bureaucracy facing discrete alternatives, and is applied in a study of the decision rules underlying freeway route selection by the California Division of Highways. The author tests the form of benefit-cost calculus utilized by the bureaucracy, the implicit evaluation of the indirect benefits and costs, and the influence of political factors on routing decisions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 7 (1976)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 55-72

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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:7:y:1976:i:spring:p:55-72

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Cited by:
  1. Richard Barke & William Riker, 1982. "A political theory of regulation with some observations on railway abandonments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 73-106, January.
  2. S. Anderson & A. Glazer, 1984. "Public opinion and regulatory behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 187-194, January.
  3. Potrafke, Niklas, 2010. "Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries," Munich Reprints in Economics 19284, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  4. Czajkowski, Mikolaj & Hanley, Nicholas & LaRiviere, Jacob, 2012. "The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Goods," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2012-17, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  5. Siqi Zheng & Matthew E. Kahn, 2013. "Understanding China's Urban Pollution Dynamics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(3), pages 731-72, September.
  6. Bergman, Mats A. & Jakobsson, Maria & Razo, Carlos, 2003. "An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions," Working Paper Series 2003:6, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  7. Dominique Prunetti & Alexandre Muzy & Eric Innocenti & Xavier Pieri, 2014. "Utility-based Multi-agent System with Spatial Interactions: The Case of Virtual Estate Development," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 43(3), pages 271-299, March.
  8. Kesternich, Iris & Heiss, Florian & McFadden, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Suit the action to the word, the word to the action: Hypothetical choices and real decisions in Medicare Part D," Discussion Papers in Economics 14124, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Alfredo Esposto, 1998. "Takings, litigation, and just compensation," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 26(4), pages 397-412, December.
  10. James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith & Christopher Taber, 1996. "What Do Bureaucrats Do? The Effects of Performance Standards and Bureaucratic Preferences on Acceptance into the JTPA Program," NBER Working Papers 5535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Shanjun Li & Matthew E. Kahn & Jerry Nickelsburg, 2014. "Public Transit Bus Procurement: The Role of Energy Prices, Regulation and Federal Subsidies," NBER Working Papers 19964, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Bastos, Guilherme S. & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2000. "Priorities In Cost Sharing For Soil And Water Conservation: A Revealed Preference Study," Working Papers 28604, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.

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