Bargaining Power, Strike Durations, and Wage Outcomes: An Analysis of Strikes in the 1880s
AbstractStrike outcomes in the 1880s had a 'winner-take-all' character. Successful strikes ended with a discrete wage gain; failed strikes ended with a return to work at the prestrike wage. The authors present a theoretical interpretation of these outcomes based on a war-of-attrition model. They fit an empirical model specifying the capitulation times of the two parties and the size of the wage gain in the event of a strike success. The results show a systematic relation between the determinants of strike success and the determinants of the wage gain for a successful strike. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 13 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
Other versions of this item:
- David Card & Craig A. Olson, 1992. "Bargaining Power, Strike Duration, and Wage Outcomes: An Analysis of Strikes in the 1880s," NBER Working Papers 4075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- C30 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - General
- C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
- C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Orley Ashenfelter & Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber & Matthew Spiegel, 1990.
"An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems,"
NBER Working Papers
3417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-33, November.
- Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S. & Spiegel, M., 1990. "An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbitration Systems," Papers 55, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Ashenfelter, O. & Currie, J. & Farber, H.S., 1990. "An Experimental Comparison Of Dispute Rates In Alternative Arbritation Systems," Working papers 562, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Joel Sobel & Takahashi, 1983. "A Multi-stage Model of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 255, David K. Levine.
- Ashenfelter, Orley & Johnson, George E, 1969. "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(1), pages 35-49, March.
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993.
"Bargaining with Private Information,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
- Moffitt, Robert, 1985. "Unemployment insurance and the distribution of unemployment spells," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 85-101, April.
- repec:pri:indrel:647 is not listed on IDEAS
- McConnell, Sheena, 1989. "Strikes, Wages, and Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 801-15, September.
- Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages S87-130, Supplemen.
- repec:fth:prinin:267 is not listed on IDEAS
- Bhattacharjee, A. & Samarjit Das, 2002. "Testing Proportionality in Duration Models with Respect to Continuous Covariates," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0220, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Hugh-Jones, David & Reinstein, David, 2012.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-489.
- Michael Huberman & Denise Young, 2000. "Hope against Hope: Persistent Canadian Unions in the Interwar Years," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-28, CIRANO.
- Hartog, Joop & Jonker, Nicole & van Ophem, Hans, 2002.
"Dual Track or Academic Route for Auditors: Does It Matter?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
640, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Nicole Jonker & Hans van Ophem & Joop Hartog, 2006. "Dual track or academic route for auditors: does it matter?," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 38(9), pages 1019-1035.
- Geraghty, Thomas M. & Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Wage strikes in 1880s America: A test of the war of attrition model," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 303-326, September.
- Michael Huberman & Denise Young, 1995. "What Did Unions Do... An Analysis of Canadian Strike Data, 1901-14," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-17, CIRANO.
- Joshua L. Rosenbloom, 1996. "Strikebreaking and the Labor Market in the United States, 1881-1874," NBER Historical Working Papers 0086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nicole Jonker & Hans van Ophem & Joop Hartog, 2002. "Dual Track or Academic Route for Auditors," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-121/4, Tinbergen Institute.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.