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Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations

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  • Lemke, Robert J.

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  • Lemke, Robert J., 2004. "Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1847-1875, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:28:y:2004:i:9:p:1847-1875
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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
    2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    3. Cho, In-Koo, 1987. "A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1367-1389, November.
    4. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
    5. Card, David, 1988. "Longitudinal Analysis of Strike Activity," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(2), pages 147-176, April.
    6. Vincent, Daniel R, 1998. "Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 275-293, May.
    7. Aldo Rustichini & Anne P. Villamil, 1996. "Intertemporal pricing in markets with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 211-227.
    8. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
    9. Hayes, Beth, 1984. "Unions and Strikes with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 57-83, January.
    10. Joel Sobel & Takahashi, 1983. "A Multi-stage Model of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 255, David K. Levine.
    11. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    12. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 23-50, February.
    13. McConnell, Sheena, 1989. "Strikes, Wages, and Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 801-815, September.
    14. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    15. Peter C. Cramton, 1984. "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(4), pages 579-593.
    16. Kennan, John, 1995. "Repeated contract negotiations with private information," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 447-472, November.
    17. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
    18. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1989. "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(S), pages 87-130, Supplemen.
    19. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 120-154, June.
    20. John Kennan, 2001. "Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(4), pages 719-755.
    21. Tracy, Joseph S, 1987. "An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(2), pages 149-173, April.
    22. Oliver Hart, 1989. "Bargaining and Strikes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(1), pages 25-43.
    23. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
    24. Vroman, Wayne, 1984. "Wage Contract Settlements in U.S. Manufacturing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(4), pages 661-665, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huan Xie, 2013. "Bargaining with uncertain value distributions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1047-1066.
    2. Andrew Wait, 2005. "Holdup and Innovation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 277-295, September.

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